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SIMPLICITY AND FREEDOM: A RESPONSE
TO STUMP AND KRETZMANN
William Hasker

One of the merits of Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann's defense of
divine simplicity is their statement of difficulties. I Before resolving the various
objections to the doctrine they formulate each objection as sharply and forcefully
as possible, so that it will not be easy for anyone to bring forward a stronger
version of it. But are their resolutions successful? In this discussion I will consider
one group of objections, having to do with the compatibility of divine simplicity
with divine freedom and with creaturely freedom and contingency. I will also
consider a benefit which they claim from divine simplicity, consisting in the
rehabilitation of the cosmological argument in the face of an objection urged by
William Rowe.
My discussion of the difficulty revolves around two propositions which Stump
and Kretzmann are forced to defend. After stating each proposition, I explain
why they must defend it; this involves setting out the difficulty which the proposition is meant to resolve. Then I expound their defense of the proposition in
question, followed by some critical remarks about the success of the defense
and of the answer to the objection.
The first proposition is, that there are actions of God which are freely chosen
by him yet such that they occur of necessity and their performance is essential
to God. That some of God's acts are freely chosen is of course a fundamental
proposition of theism. But the doctrine of divine simplicity entails that "the
standard distinction between an entity's essential and accidental intrinsic properties cannot apply to God," so that "It is impossible that God have any intrinsic
accidental properties" (p. 354). This formulation relies on the distinction between
real, or intrinsic properties and Cambridge, or extrinsic properties; as an explanation of this distinction they say that "a change in x's extrinsic properties can
occur without a change in x, while a change in x's intrinsic properties is as such
a change in x" (p. 354). The reason why this distinction is needed is that "no
entity, not even a mathematical or a divine entity, can be exempted from having
extrinsic accidental properties" (p. 354). (This may however be a mistake; it can
be argued that if all of God's intrinsic properties are essential so are all of his
extrinsic properties. For let P be an extrinsic property of God's: then knowing
that God has P, which intuitively ought to be an intrinsic property of God's,
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will characterize God in all and only those possible worlds in which God has
P, so that if the intrinsic property is essential to God so will the extrinsic property
be essential to him. Later on, this point will turn out to be of some importance.)
So if God's performing a certain action is an intrinsic property of God's, it
is also an essential property of his, and thus necessary rather than contingent.
And if some such action is freely chosen by God, then we have an instance of
our first proposition: an action which is freely chosen, yet necessary and essential
to God. But how can this be? As Stump and Kretzmann say, "the doctrine of
divine free choice can be construed as the claim that some of God's properties
are properties he chooses to have" (p. 357)-but how can God choose to have
properties which are necessary and essential to him?
In order to reconcile this we begin by clarifying the sense in which God's
actions are said to be necessary. Those of God's actions which are freely chosen
are not absolutely necessitated but rather conditionally necessitated-for instance:
God's keeping his promise to Abraham is conditionally necessary, given that
God has made such a promise, since God, being morally perfect, cannot break
a promise that he has made. But it is not absolutely necessary; there are possible
worlds in which God neither makes nor keeps such a promise.
This point about conditional necessitation does not by itself resolve the difficulty; instead, it points up at least two additional difficulties. First, an action
which is even conditionally necessitated would not normally be said to be an
instance of free choice; rather, it is a consequence of the necessitating event,
which itself may (or may not) be an instance of free choice. But if all of God's
actions are conditionally necessitated, where is there any room for free choice
left? the second question is whether an action which is only conditionally necessary can be said to be essential to God. A being's essential properties are those
which it has in all the worlds in which it exists. But there are possible worlds
in which God exists but makes no promises to Abraham; indeed, there are
possible worlds in which God creates no universe at all. So how can promising
and creating be essential to God?
In order to clarify this we must investigate more closely the sense in which
creating is said to be both necessary and essential to God. Stump and Kretzmann
write:
That God's willing to create (or any other act of divine free choice) is
conditionally necessitated is a consequence of God's eternaIity. Because
God is timeless, no change in him is possible. If he does will to create,
then, it is not possible for him to change and will not to create. Nor
can it be supposed that it is open to God either to create or not to create
and that he exercises his option to create, because of course this supposition also entails a change in God: that he is first in the state of neither
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willing to create nor willing not to create and then is in the state of
willing to create .... Willing to create, then, is necessary to God, but
only conditionally necessary, where the condition is the fact that he
does will to create (p. 367).

So the necessity of God's actions is derived from the immutability of God's
will, which is in tum a consequence of the divine timelessness. Still, there are
possible worlds in which God does not create, so how is creating essential to
him? The answer to this is found in the fact that the notion of essential properties
with which Aquinas (and therefore also Stump and Kretzmann) is working is
different than our modem notion:
The fact that [Aquinas] maintains views entailing both that there is no
contingency in God and that God's status as creator is not a feature of
God in every possible world strongly suggests that he does not conceive
of contingency in terms of differences across possible worlds generally
but, rather, in terms of branching time-lines emanating from a single
possible initial world-state. And so we propose taking Thomas's 'essential,' 'necessary,' 'accidental,' and 'contingent' to refer to modalities
that can be determined by inspecting some subset of possible worlds
consisting of the branching time-lines emanating from a single possible
initial world-state-an initial state-set, we will call it (p. 369).
In Thomas, then, we have a whole family of modal concepts, defined in terms
of sets of possible worlds which branch out from the same initial state. Henceforth
I shall refer to these as I-modalities, to distinguish them from ordinary or O-modalities. And when Aquinas says that creating is essential to God, we are to
understand this as meaning that it is I-essential: that is, that given the actual
initial state of the world, which includes God's intention to create, it is I-necessary
that God creates and I-impossible that he should not create, in spite of the fact
that there are possible worlds (i.e., O-possible worlds) in which he does not
create. And so consistency is preserved.
But what is meant, given all this, by the claim that God is free with respect
to creating or not creating the universe? Stump and Kretzmann answer as follows:
Because God is eternal and consequently absolutely immutable, we
cannot accurately say that God could have willed not to create. But
because God's willing to create is not absolutely necessary [i.e., it is
not O-necessary], we can correctly say that it might have been the case
that God willed not to create (p. 368).
Here, then, we have stump and Kretzmann's defense of the first main proposition. Is the defense successful? It should be noted, first of all, that their position
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involves a particular view concerning the relationship between a timeless being
and events in time. An initial state-set of possible worlds can be represented by
a diagram which begins on the left with a point representing the initial state,
and branches out to the right into the various alternative world-lines. If these
worlds contain a timeless being, that being's "eternal now" could be represented
by a circle at the top of the page. This circle, of course, will not intersect any
of the time-lines, since the "eternal now" is not identical with any moment of
time. Stump and Kretzmann's view, however, amounts to drawing a line, as it
were, connecting the circle representing the "eternal now" with the point representing the initial state. That is to say: nothing can occur in any of the time-lines
leading away from that initial state, which is inconsistent with the contents of
the "eternal now"-for instance, with something which God immutably wills to
be the case. This view about the relationship of time and eternity is essential to
Stump and Kretzmann's case-and its consequences, as we shall see, are momentous.
h is also of interest here to note a comment they make about their own solution:
"In a sense ... we are weakening the claims basic to the doctrine of simplicity"
(p. 369). It seems to me that this is very true: the claim -that there is nothing
accidental or contingent in God is indeed seriously weakened when it is stipulated
to mean only that there is nothing which is I-accidental or I-contingent, though
there may be (and in fact are) a great many of God's properties which are
O-accidental and O-contingent. To be sure, Stump and Kretzmann could reply
that it is Aquinas' doctrine of simplicity which they are expounding and, since
the I-modal concepts are the ones Aquinas employs, no actual weakening is
involved; rather, the appearance of weakening arises because of our original
misunderstanding of Aquinas in terms of modem (or 0-) modal concepts.
Nevertheless, a question remains concerning the coherence of the doctrine of
simplicity as they construe it. If the doctrine of simplicity cannot tolerate there
being I-contingent properties in God, how can it tolerate O-contingent properties
in him? If on the other hand O-contingent properties are compatible with simplicity, why not I-contingent properties as well?
The part of Stump and Kretzmann's paper which is most relevant to this is
7(ii), "Two sorts of necessity without a real distinction," in which they argue
that "the difference between absolutely and conditionally necessitated acts of
will does not constitute a metaphysical difference in God's nature" (p. 371).
They state that "God wills himself and everything else he wills in a single
immutable act of will" (p. 371), and that the unity of this single act is not
compromised by the differences in the objects of that act according to which
some of them are absolutely and others only conditionally necessitated. It is
difficult for me to arrive at a conclusion with regard to the success or failure of
this argument.' I do, however, note the following point: the argument as they
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give it does not seem to depend in any essential way on the claim that those
properties of God which are not a-necessary and a-essential are nevertheless
I-necessary and I-essential. To put the matter differently, it seems to me that
the argument would be equally successful (or unsuccessful) if it were used to
support, not merely the claim that a-necessary properties can co-exist in the
simple nature of God with those which are a-contingent but I-necessary, but
the stronger claim that they can co-exist with properties which are both a-contingent and I-contingent. In order to test this, I suggest that the reader go through
the argument, on pp. 371-3, and replace the words "absolutely necessitated"
with "necessitated" and the words "conditionally necessitated" with "contingent."
So far as I can see, the force of the argument is unaffected by these substitutions. 3
If I am right about this, and if the argument is in fact successful, then the doctrine
of divine simplicity may be able to dispense altogether with the claim that all
of God's acts are necessitated. But this would seem to be a rather radical modification of the doctrine of simplicity, and I doubt very much that Stump and
Kretzmann will welcome it.
Let us now return to the question raised, and left unanswered, a few pages
ago: Is the conditional necessitation of one of God's actions consistent with that
action's being freely chosen? The most pertinent thing Stump and Kretzmann
say about this is in the passage already cited: "But because God's willing to
create is not absolutely necessary, we can correctly say that it might have been
the case that God willed not to create" (p. 368), which is to say that God's not
creating is logically possible. This is undeniably true. Normally, however, more
is thought to be required for free choice, than that an alternative to the action
is logically possible. The real issue comes down to this: What is it that determines
that the universe and God are in one initial world state rather than another?
Given the initial world state, all of God's subsequent actions must be consistent
with his intentions as they are in that state-but how does it come about that he
has those intentions? Is this the result of a free choice on God's part? It might
seem that Stump and Kretzmann answer this question when they say, "which
logical possibility is actualized and which logical possibility is left unactualized
depends on nothing other than God's will" (p. 369). But this is not a clear-cut
answer to our question, because in their view there are many things which depend
on God's will which are nevertheless not instances of free choice on God's
part-for example, God wills his own perfect goodness, but he wills it of necessity
and not as a matter of free choice (p. 364). So our question remains: Is the initial
world-state something that is freely chosen by God, or isn't it?
Suppose, first of all, that the initial world-state is not freely chosen by God.
All of God's subsequent actions are determined by that initial world state, so
on this supposition it follows that God makes no free choices at all. It would
still be true that alternative initial world-states, implying alternative divine

197

SIMPLICITY AND FREEDOM

actions, are logically possible. But this is by no means enough for free choice
on God's part.
Suppose on the other hand that the initial world-state is freely chosen by God.
On this alternative the freedom of God's choices is immediately guaranteed-but
how do we get the result that this choice of God's is "necessitated" and is such
that, as they say, "we cannot accurately say that God could have willed not to
create" (p. 368)? To say that God's actions are I-necessary is to say that they
are necessitated by the initial state of the universe-but how can this have any
bearing on the modal status of the choice of that initial state itself?
Stump and Kretzmann's answer to this is found, I believe, in the argument
already quoted from p. 367, in which they say, "That God's willing to create
(or any other act of divine free choice) is conditionally necessitated is a consequence of God's eternality." But this argument suffers from a strange and
debilitating flaw. The argument may be formalized as follows:
(I)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

God is timeless.
God is absolutely unchangeable.
God wills to create.
It is not possible for God to change from
a state of willing to create to a state of not
willing to create.
It is not possible for God to change from
a state in which he neither wills to create
nor wills not to create, to a state in which
he wills not to create.

Premise
From(l)
Premise

From (2)

From (2)

(6)

Therefore,
(7)

It is not the case that God could have
willed not to create.

From (3), (4),
(5), (6)

Line (6) is left open for the insertion of the missing premise, since it is obvious
that the argument is not valid with only the premises that have been given. It
is, furthermore, clear what the missing premise will have to be. Consider
(6) If God were to will not to create, then
either God would change from a state of
willing to create to a state of willing not
to create, or God would change from a
state in which he neither wills to create
nor wills not to create, to a state in which
he wills not to create.

Premise
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If this is, indeed, the missing premise, then the inference from (3), (4), (5), and
(6) to (7) is valid. But (6) suffers from a rather serious flaw-it is inconsistent
with (1), the premise which asserts the timelessness of God! For if God is

timeless, then a decision on his part not to create would not involve a change
of either of the kinds considered in (6); such a decision would, rather, be a
timeless act involving no change at all. The irony in this is that Stump and
Kretzmann repeatedly affirm, throughout their essay, the timelessness of God's
acts; so it is passing strange that in this passage they construct an argument
which relies on the contrary assumption. Yet I can find no other way to construe
the argument they have given us. But it is obvious that such an argument offers
no support for their contention that God's decision to create is conditionally
necessitated, and that God could not have willed not to create. And their failure
to support this contention must be judged to be a serious flaw in their entire case.
The second major proposition Stump and Kretzmann must defend, is that the
conditional necessitation of God' s acts of will is consistent with the existence of
contingency and free choice in the objects of those acts. The need for this
proposition is obvious. It has already been affirmed that all God's acts are at
least conditionally necessitated, and it is a basic tenet of theism that created
beings (towards which many of God's acts are directed) are contingent and that
some of them exercise free choice. But the difficulty is also obvious: Since "God
wills that P" entails "P," it would seem that the necessitation of God's acts of
will must pass over to the objects of those acts, which will therefore be necessitated
in just the same way as God's acts themselves.
The basic answer to this objection is implicit in what has already been said,
and is made clear in the following quotation from Aquinas.
Conditional necessity in a cause cannot result in absolute necessity in
the effect. But God wills something with regard to creatures not with
absolute necessity but only with the necessity that comes from a condition, as was shown above. Therefore, absolute necessity in created
things cannot result from the divine will; but it is only absolute necessity
that rules out contingency (SCG I 85; pp. 373-4).
That is to say: God's acts of will are I-necessary, but not O-necessary, and so
the objects of those acts are also I-necessary, but this does not rule out their
being O-contingent. This is true enough, but it makes Stump and Kretzmann's
phrase, "Necessity in the will and contingency in its objects" (p. 373), seem
rather misleading. It is true, on this view, that God's acts of will are necessarythat is, I-necessary-and that its creaturely objects are contingent-that is, O-contingent. But it is also true that the acts of will are O-contingent, and that the
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creaturely objects are I-necessary. So the apparent contrast between the two,
with respect to modal status, turns out to be illusory.
So the conditional necessitation of God's acts of will is consistent with a-contingency in creatures-but is it consistent with free choice in the creatures? Once
again we are confronted with the same problem raised above: Isn't more needed
for freedom of choice, than the mere logical possibility of alternative courses of
action? The answer in this case, however, is clearer and easier than it is when
we are considering divine action. A timeless God, perhaps, can make choices
outside of time which determine the possibilities, and actualities, within time.
But human agents cannot do this; they are limited to the alternatives as they
exist within time as they make their choices. And if we accept Stump and
Kretzmann's view about the relationship between God and time, these alternatives
are quite limited--Dr rather non-existent. Take for example God's intention to
keep his promise to Abraham. 4 This intention, obviously enough, entails the
existence of Abraham, and so it entails that none of the persons who concei vably
might have done something which would have prevented Abraham's existence
(for instance, by causing one of his ancestors to die childless) could possibly
have done so; their doing such a thing is I-impossible. But of course God has
many more intentions than the intention to keep that promise to Abraham. It
would in fact commonly be thought that, for each thing that does in fact happen
God has a specific intention either to bring that thing about or to permit its being
brought about by finite agents and to sustain their existence as they do so. But
it is I-necessary, on Stump and Kretzmann' s view, that things take place as God
intends and knows that they shall take place, and I-impossible that they should
take place otherwise. In fact, our notion of the branching diagram of world-lines
emanating from a single initial world state will now have to be revised. If the
timeless being in the diagram is the Christian God, there are no branching
world-lines; there is only a single line, representing the only possible world
which is consistent with the things intended and known by the timeless God in
that initial state.
What we have come to here is of course the well-known problem of divine
foreknowledge and human freedom.' It is often thought that the doctrine of divine
timelessness offers a way to escape from this problem, and Stump and Kretzmann
seem to endorse this view. 6 But this escape is closed off if we accept their view
about the relationship of the timeless God to events in time. On that view, God
does not, indeed, intend things or know things in time, but the consequences
with regard to the possibilities that exist in time are just the same as if he did:
whatever p()d timelessly knows and wills is from the very beginning I-necessary,
and anything else is I-impossible.?
We tum, finally, to an advantage Stump and Kretzmann claim to derive from
their view with respect to the cosmological argument. The form of this argument
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which they have in view appeals to the principle of sufficient reason, which
requires that every contingent fact should have a deductive explanation. William
Rowe has recently argued that this principle is false; a crucial premise in his
argument is
(R) For any contingent fact C the fact which explains it cannot be a
necessary fact, otherwise C would not be contingent. 8
To this Stump and Kretzmann reply:
As we have explained it here, the doctrine of simplicity entails that God
is a necessary being all of whose acts of will are at least conditionally
necessitated, and that among these acts of will is the volition that certain
things be contingent. No matter what the modal status of God's conditionally necessitated acts of will may be, if it is possible for a logically
necessary, omnipotent being to will that certain entities or events be
contingent, as we have given some reason for thinking it is, then (R)
is false (p. 377).
Stump and Kretzmann express themselves in this passage (and not only in this
passage: see p. 374) in a way that suggests endorsement of an argument which
is patently question-begging. It is undeniable that "God necessarily wills that E
occur contingently" entails "E occurs contingently." But this observation has no
force whatever when what is in question is the consistency of the claim that God
necessarily wills contingent events. For the objection that must be met claims
that "God necessarily wills that E occur" entails "E occurs of necessity." And
this entailment is in no way canceled or invalidated by adding to the premise
that E's occurrence is to be contingent-rather, that addition leaves us with an
inconsistent premise and a contradictory conclusion.
It is possible, however, that Stump and Kretzmann do not intend to endorse
this question-begging argument. For they have, indeed, given other arguments
to show that God's necessitated acts of will can have as their objects contingent
events. The main such argument is the one considered above, to the effect that
God's acts of will can be I-necessary while their creaturely effects are O-contingent. And this, as we have seen, is indeed logically possible.
But how does this show Rowe's (R) to be false? In formulating (R) Rowe
naturally had in view ordinary logical necessity and contingency-in our terminology, O-necessity and O-contingency. There is nothing whatever in his article to
suggest that he had in view anything like our I-modal concepts. But if (R) is
understood in this way, the situation stump and Kretzmann have in mind--God's
conditionally necessitated willing that certain things be contingent-is in no way
in conflict with (R), for God's act of will, though I-necessary, is nevertheless
O-contingent, just as (R) says it should be. So Stump and Kretzmann have not
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refuted (R), and a cosmological argument which depends on the principle
criticized by Rowe gets no help from them.
In summary, it seems to me that these considerations point to some serious
weaknesses in Stump and Kretzmann's defense of divine simplicity. To be sure,
the doctrine of simplicity may not be intimately related to the cosmological
argument, and so the failure of their attempted rehabilitation of that argument
may not be an especially serious problem for them. But the other problems noted
here cut pretty deep. If the doctrine of simplicity cannot be shown to be consistent
with human and divine freedom, then that doctrine cannot be accepted as part
of the Christian conception of God.
Huntington College
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